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1. Introduction
The hold-up problem describes how inefficiency might emerge in situations that feature
relation-specific investment. The inefficiency arises if it is impossible to write a contract
on the investment level or on the compensations of the investor. Because the investment
is relation-specific, the concerned parties will bargain over the terms of the transaction
after the investment costs are sunk. Traditionally it is assumed that sunk costs can not
influence bargaining outcomes (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). This implies that
the bargaining relates to the gross surplus available and ignores the net surplus that
takes into account the investment costs. If this is the case, then Grout (1984), Grossman
and Hart (1986), and Tirole (1986) have shown that there is necessarily underinvestment,
because the marginal return on investment will not be obtained by the investing party.
To see this consider two players α and β where player α chooses an investment level I.
This investment level is associated with a private cost C(I) ≡ cI and leads to a potential
surplus V (I) where V fulfils the Inada conditions. Clearly the optimal investment level
is given by C ′(I) = V ′(I). However, to realise the surplus V player α has to reach an
agreement with player β about the distribution of the surplus among them. If their
negotiation leads to the Nash bargaining solution, then the private return on investment
for player α will be V/2. Thus the optimal investment level that player α can choose for
herself is given by C ′(I) = V ′(I)/2, which leads to a suboptimally low investment level.
The argument that sunk costs do not influence bargaining outcomes is most convincing,
when the bargaining model under consideration has a unique solution. Examples for this
are the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) and the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game,
which has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Ståhl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982).
But there exist many non-cooperative games with multiple solutions. For example in the
Nash demand game (Nash, 1953) every division is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Van Damme, Selten, and Winter (1990) have shown that the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining
game has multiple subgame perfect equilibria under reasonable assumptions. It is obvious
that if multiple bargaining solutions are possible then efficient investment will be sustained
in some equilibria.
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In recent years evolutionary models by Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002)
have shown that under certain circumstances investment decisions indeed influence the
behaviour of agents in subsequent bargaining. These models reject the paradigm of
sunk costs. Players do form their beliefs about their opponents bargaining behaviour
conditional on the investment decisions that are taken by players. In combination with
a bargaining model that exhibits multiple Nash equilibria, this allows the selection of an
equilibrium that can be justified by a forward induction argument. This might permit
to sustain the efficient investment level and thus solve the hold-up problem for one sided
investment.
While the traditional literature on the hold-up problem is mostly concerned with
situation where investment is one-sided, there exist interesting situations where the
investment is two-sided. Imagine an employee who acquires some firm specific skills.
This might be associated with costs for the employee, e.g., effort, and costs for the firm,
e.g., training costs. Dawid and MacLeod (2001, 2008) have shown that the optimistic
results of Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002) do not generalise to the case of
two-sided investment. Their model predicts that the hold-up problem might be worse in
an evolutionary setting than in the traditional strategic models
This paper extends the literature on the application of evolutionary game theory to
the hold-up problem. In contrast to the existing work I consider players who in line with
traditional strategic models do not condition their beliefs on the investment decisions.
But both players consider themselves to be the sole residual claimants in case of a change
in the investment level. This provides an incentive for efficient investment, but will lead
to conflicting demands when the investment level changes since it is impossible that
both players are the sole residual claimant.
But because players base their beliefs on incomplete samples of past plays, it is possible
for them to coordinate on a stable convention with efficient investment. This is not only
true in the case of one sided investment, but also in the case of two-sided investment for
a considerable range of parameters. The distribution of the surplus will guarantee both
players a positive net payoff. But in contrast to Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles
(2002), the distribution of the surplus will not favour the investing party.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the
existing literature on evolutionary models of the hold-up problem. Section 3 discusses
the set up of the present model in detail. Section 4 derives the results for the case of
one-sided investment and Section 5 does so for two-sided investment. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
2.1. Bargaining
Evolutionary analysis has been used as an equilibrium selection criterion in the Nash
demand game by Young (1993b). He considers a two population model to allow for
asymmetric bargaining conventions between the two populations. Every round two
players, one from each population, are randomly matched to play a Nash demand game.
The players have only very bounded rationality. Every player observes a sample of other
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agents’ past plays that is drawn from the last m periods of plays. Then the strategies of
players are best responses to the observed distribution of the play of their opponents
population. The strategic considerations exclude every reasoning concerning preferences,
rationality, or the information sets of their opponents. If they would play against a
natural stochastic process, then their behaviour would not be different. In addition they
are assumed to make a mistake (or experiment) from time to time in which case they
play a random strategy.
Young shows that for any initial history of plays, players will coordinate on some
bargaining conventions in which everybody always plays a certain demand that is
compatible with her opponents’ demand. These conventions can be displaced by a
number of subsequent errors though. Note that a sufficiently large number of such errors
has to occur within m periods (the length of history) because players do only samples
from the last m periods of play. Young shows that if such errors occur, then in the very
long run the convention that corresponds to the (generalised) Nash bargaining solution
is most likely to prevail. This result is driven by the fact that the number of errors
that are necessary to displace the Nash bargaining solution is larger than for any other
bargaining convention. Thus Young provides an evolutionary model that supports the
(generalised) Nash bargaining solution.
2.2. The Hold-up Problem
The framework of Young has been extended by Tröger (2002) to study a version of the
hold-up problem. Ellingsen and Robles (2002) consider a very similar model that yields
the same results. In Tröger’s model players play a two-stage investment-bargaining
game. In the first stage one of the two players chooses an investment I from a discrete
set at some cost CI . This investment determines the size of the potential gross surplus
VI that can be realised. In the second stage both players bargain over the gross surplus
by playing a Nash demand game. Note that the costs of investment are sunk at the time
of bargaining.
For this case of one sided investment Tröger shows that the unique stochastically
stable equilibrium is an investment bargaining convention where the efficient investment
level is chosen.
The models of Tröger and Ellingson and Robles use more sophisticated decision rules
than Young’s original model. Players choose their demands in the bargaining stage
contingent on the investment level that has been chosen. Players believe that the demand
from their opponents following different investment levels are independent from each
other, but depend on the investment level chosen.
Thus players form separate beliefs about their opponents play for each bargaining
subgame. The beliefs about bargaining behaviour that follows a specific investment level
I are based exclusively on past bargaining behaviour that has followed upon this specific
investment level. Given these beliefs about the distribution of their opponents’ demands,
players choose a best response to this distribution.
These beliefs imply that the investing players believe that their investment decision
will influence their opponents behaviour in a very specific way, i.e. they can choose
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among several demand distributions of their opponents by setting their investment level.
They will then decide upon their investment level taking into account their expectations
about the following bargaining behaviour.
If given a history of play, a specific investment can not be a best response, then this
investment level would only be chosen if the investing player makes an error. Both
papers by Tröger and Ellingson an Robles assume that in this case the player who makes
an error at the investment stage also makes an error at the bargaining stage i.e. makes
a random demand. This particular error structure allows that the history of bargaining
play following an investment level that is not a best response can take on a random
form.
Because of the way players form their beliefs, it follows that the beliefs about the
bargaining behaviour following such an investment level may vary randomly. Thus a
convention with investment level I can only be stochastically stable if for all beliefs
that a player can hold about the bargaining behaviour of their opponents following all
other investment levels, choosing I is his best response at the investment stage. The
only conventions for which this is true are those where the most efficient investment
level is chosen and the investing player gets a surplus that is higher than the maximum
potential payoff from any other investment level.
2.2.1. Signalling
The choice of the investment level can be interpreted as a signal. Suppose that I and I ′
would just be two different signals without any influence on the available surplus that one
player can send prior to the Nash bargaining game. If this signal would be interpreted
by both players as a credible signal concerning the play in the Nash bargaining game,
then this would not alter the argument presented above. In Tröger’s model the structure
of the players’ beliefs assures that the choice of the investment level is regarded as a
credible signal by the players.
This implies that the choice of the investment level does not alter the bargaining
behaviour by changing the size of the available surplus, but by sending a credible signal.
Thus the investing player can claim almost the entire surplus to himself because he is
able to send a credible signal.
This point can be illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes game. It is commonly believed
that if only one player is allowed to send a signal prior to playing the game, then this
has two effects. The coordination problem will be solved and the player who sends the
signal is able to determine the outcome of this game.
2.3. Two-sided Investment
Now consider a Battle of Sexes game where both players can send a signal. In this case
coordination can not be guarantied anymore. This would indicate that the results of
Tröger and Ellingson do not generalise to the case of two-sided investment.
This intuition is confirmed by Dawid and MacLeod (2001). Using a very similar
framework they show that if both players can choose between different investment levels
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no stable investment-bargaining convention can be assured. The reason for this is that
an investment-bargaining convention in the case of two-sided investment requires both
players to choose a specific investment level. As in the models of Tröger and Ellingson the
out of equilibrium beliefs about the bargaining behaviour can take a random form. But
in general there does not exist an investment bargaining convention where both players
are better of than in every other bargaining convention following different investment
levels. Consequently every convention can be displaced by some out of equilibrium
beliefs. This implies that no investment-bargaining convention will be stochastically
stable.
3. The Model
I consider a model with two populations A and B. Every period t = 1, 2, ... a player α is
randomly selected from A and a another player β is randomly selected from B. These
two players are matched to play a two stage investment-bargaining game.
3.1. The Game
At the investment stage α chooses an investment level I which is associated with a private
cost CI . Simultaneously β chooses an investment level J at cost CJ . The investments of
the players creates a gross surplus of the size VIJ .
At the bargaining stage players divide the gross surplus by playing a Nash demand
game. Players α and β simultaneously make demands x and y. Players receive their
respective demand if, and only if, the sum of their demands is smaller or equal the gross
surplus that is available. The surplus of α and β in the investment bargaining game is
then given by
(piα(I, xJ, y),piβ(I, xJ, y)) =
{
(x− CI , y − CJ) if x+ y ≤ VIJ
(−CI ,−CJ) otherwise
.
Two demands x and y are said to be compatible if given I and J , x+ y ≤ VIJ .
Because every division is a Nash equilibrium of the Nash demand game (Nash, 1953),
every combination of investment levels that yields a positive net surplus VIJ − CI − CJ
can be supported in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To see this consider a strategy
combination (I, x, J, y) where x + y = VIJ and and x − CI and y − CJ are positive.
Now suppose that for all I ′ ∈ I \ I the strategies (x′, y′) in the subgame following the
investment levels I ′ and J are x′ = 0 and y′ = VI′J . Analogously suppose that for
all investment levels J ′ ∈ J \ J the strategies (x′′, y′′) in the subgame following the
investment levels I and J ′ are x′′ = VIJ ′ and y′′ = 0. It is obvious that given these
strategies no player has an incentive to deviate from their investment level because this
would yield a negative payoff of −CI′ or −CJ ′ respectively and thus (I, x, J, y) is a Nash
equilibrium. Because every division of the surplus that satisfies x+ y = V is a Nash
equilibrium, it is subgame perfect.
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While there can in general be other Nash equilibria, the above equilibria are clearly
the relevant ones for the analysis of the hold-up problem. In particular this implies that
inefficient low investment as well as efficient high investment can be a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. The aim of the following evolutionary analysis is to identify those
equilibria which are most likely to be chosen.
For technical reasons it is assumed that the action sets of players are finite. The
investment levels of players I and J are chosen from the finite sets of feasible demands
I ={I0, I1, . . . , IN} and J ={J0, J1, . . . , JN} respectively. Let δ be a base unit that is
chosen such that for all possible investment levels VIJδ ,
CI
δ ,
CJ
δ , and
maxIJVIJ
2δ are integers.
The demands of the players are assumed to be elements of the set of possible demands
X = {δ, 2δ, . . .maxIJ(VIJ)− δ}.
The lower bound of this set is motivated by the fact the a demand of zero is weakly
dominated by any other demand that a player could make. The upper bound of this set
is justified by the fact that given the lower bound of X all demands that are larger than
maxIJ(VIJ)− δ are weakly dominated by all other demands in X.
The action sets of players from a A and B are then given by the finite sets I×X and
J×X respectively.
3.2. Players Behaviour
The beliefs of the players about their opponents strategies are based on partial observa-
tions of the history of plays. Every period a player α draws a sample A which consists
of a entries from the last m records of play. Similarly, β draws a sample B consisting of
b entries from the last m records of play.
The beliefs of player α about the investment behaviour of β are given by the observed
distribution of investment choices of β which is denoted by q(J |A). Similarly the beliefs of
α about the bargaining behaviour of β are given by the observed cumulative distribution
of absolute demands which is denoted by F (y|A). Analogously the beliefs of β can be
characterised by q(I|B) and F (x|B).
If players interpret their opponents’ demands as absolute values which are independent
of the available surplus, this implies that every player considers himself to be the sole
residual claimant. This obviously provides an incentive to choose the most efficient
investment level, which is crucial in driving the results in this paper. But it evidently is
impossible that both players are the sole residual claimant. Thus this beliefs will lead to
a situation of conflict where the players make incompatible demands. The evolutionary
analysis will then serve to answer two questions: Whether given this conflict an efficient
investment-bargaining norm is likely to emerge and how the surplus will be divided
among the two players.
The occurrence of a conflict at the bargaining stage contrasts with the interpretation
of demands as relative shares. In this case there would be no reason why players should
make incompatible demands after a change of the investment level. The present model
thus provides an explicit description of the conflict that will arise about the distribution
of the additional surplus after a change in the investment level.
On a more fundamental level this assumption deals with the question of how agents
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interpret past events in a similar but different situation. This question arises because
the players beliefs about their opponents behaviour at the bargaining stage following the
investment levels I ′ and J ′ are based on past bargaining behaviour that followed upon
any investment levels (I, J) ∈ I × J. This is expressed by F (y|A) and F (x|B) being
independent of I and J. This is the main difference between this model and the models
by Tröger (2002), Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Dawid and MacLeod (2001, 2008).
In their models players do not draw on information about bargaining situations that
have followed different investment levels to form their beliefs about the bargaining that
follows an specific investment level. In Dawid and MacLeod (2001) the players beliefs
consists of different cumulative probability distributions of their opponents demands
FˆIJ(.) for all (I, J) ∈ I × J and a distribution qˆ(.) of the investment levels1. These
beliefs about the bargaining behaviour following a specific investment level are updated
exclusively by bargaining that takes place after this investment level has been chosen.
Since no demand is considered independently of an investment level, the question of
interpreting them as absolute or relative demands does not arise.
These assumptions, however, imply that even if a player beliefs that the probability
qˆ(I ′) that the investment level I ′ will be played is zero, he still holds very specific
beliefs FˆI′J about what will happen when this investment level will be played2. Thus
players that observe an investment level I ′ will not use any information about bargaining
behaviour that has followed different investment levels. This is even the case if I ′ is a
very unusual investment level that has not been observed for a very long time.
The separation of beliefs along the lines of different investment levels also assumes
away the possibility that players actually regard prior investment as irrelevant for the
bargaining situation. In these models the investment decision serves as a credible and
unambiguous signal that coordinates the expectations of players. However, the interesting
difference of these models and the concept of forward induction is that the content of
the signal that is sent by a specific investment level is endogenously determined by the
evolutionary process. But if the goal of these papers is to explain why people seem to
be able to overcome the hold-up problem without relying on explicit forward induction,
then the assumption that investment serves as a credible signal does not seem to be a
very powerful test of this hypothesis.
While there certainly does not exist a well developed theory about how players use
1They also assume that players have the constant belief that the surplus will be shared according to
the Nash bargaining solution if both players choose the same investment level.
2Evidently beliefs that contain a distribution of bargaining demands after an investment level that is
believed to be chosen with probability zero can not be based on a single sample of past play. This is
due to the fact that no sample of play can contain zero occurrences of a specific investment level I ′
and at the same time occurrences of demands that followed upon I ′. This problem only occurs in the
case of two-sided investment since in models of one sided investment the probabilities of investment
levels qˆ(.) are not modelled explicitly.
Dawid and MacLeod (2001) circumvents this problem by associating the state of the model with
the beliefs of all players which are updated according to a specific algorithm. This implies however
that a population has to consists of a set of players that must not change. In contrast, if as in the
present model the state space is associated with a truncated history of past play, then the players
in each population can be replaced at all time. The new player will simply draw a sample of the
history of play and forms beliefs based on the observed past plays.
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information obtained in similar but different situation I believe that they certainly do
so. Including this feature therefore constitutes a major advantage of the present model
over the existing literature.
The interpretation of demands as absolute values seems to be sensible for the given
context. As an example of this consider two firms where firm α produces a relation
specific good that is used in the production process of firm β. Suppose that α invests
into a more efficient production technology. Firm α might very well expect to be able to
charge the same price to β as before. On the contrary firm β might believe that changes
in production costs should be passed through to output prices.
Given their beliefs the players choose their strategies as follows. At the bargaining
stage players simultaneously choose their best response given their beliefs and the
investment decisions taken by both players. The payoff expected by α playing x is then
given by
E(piα(x)|I, J,A) = xF (VIJ − x|A)− CI (1)
and defined analogously for β. Note that both players know both investment decisions
I and J at the bargaining stage. Thus α and β will demand argmaxxE(piα(x)|I, J,A)
and maxy E(piβ(y)|I, J,B) respectively.
If for any player different demands yield the highest expected payoff at the bargaining
stage, then this player plays a probability distribution over these demands. The support
of this distribution is the set of demands that yield the maximum expected payoff for
and which there exists a compatible demand of their opponent given the investment
levels I and J . This is motivated by the fact that any other demand is weakly dominated
by the demands for which there exists a compatible demand. This implies that given the
investment level I and J a player chooses a demand from the set XIJ = X ∩ [δ, VIJ − δ].
Since x and y are understood as absolute value it can happen that some or all of
the expected demands are larger than the surplus available after a specific choice of
investment levels. This case can be interpreted as insecurity about the distribution of
opponents demands in which case the player assumes that the worst case will happen,
i.e. no coordination will take place. If all demands with positive probability in A or B
are larger than the total surplus, then the expected payoff of all demands is zero and
consequently the player will play a probability distribution with support XIJ .
At the investment stage players simultaneously decide upon their investment levels.
They choose their best response given their sample of play and their anticipations
about the payoff in the bargaining games. These anticipations are based on backwards
induction which associates the payoffs maxxE(piα(x)|I, J,A) and maxy E(piβ(y)|I, J,B)
with the subgame following the investment levels I and J .
Therefore the payoff expected by α when choosing an investment level is given by
E(piα(I)|A) =
∑
J∈J
q(J |A)max
x
(E(piα(x)|I, J,A)) (2)
and defined analogously for β. Thus at the investment stage α and β will choose
argmaxI E(piα(I)|A) and argmaxJ E(piβ(J)|B) respectively.
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Again if different actions yield the highest expected payoff for any player, then this
player plays a probability distribution over these actions. At the investment stage
this probability distribution has full support over all investment levels that yield the
maximum expected payoff.
In addition players make occasional mistakes at both stages with probability % in
which case they choose a random action either at the investment or the bargaining
stage. The probabilities of making an error at the investment and bargaining stage are
independent. It is thus possible that no, one, or both players make a mistake at the
investment stage and that in the same period no, one, or both players make a mistake
at the bargaining stage
This constitutes the second major difference between this paper and Tröger (2002),
Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Dawid and MacLeod (2001). In these papers if a player
makes an error at the bargaining stage, then he will also make an error at the bargaining
stage i.e. make a random demand. While this assumption is crucial for the results
of these papers no particular motivation is provided for this specific assumption. The
results of the present model would not change if this assumption would be adopted
instead of independent probabilities.
3.3. Equilibrium Concepts
The play in a period t is denoted by (It, xt, Jt, yt) which is abbreviated by (I, x, J, y)t.
The complete history of play in period t is given by
((I, x, J, y)1, (I, x, J, y)2, ...(I, x, J, y)t).
The behaviour of players determines a Markov chain P $. This Markov chain is
called the perturbed investment-bargaining process. The state space S of P $ consists
of sequences s of length m that consist of records of play (I, x, J, y) ∈ I×X × J×X.
Because the strategy spaces are finite, the state space is finite as well.
A state at time t is denoted by
st = ((I, x, J, y)t−m+1, (I, x, J, y)t−m−+2, ...(I, x, J, y)t).
The Markov chain P $ is irreducible and aperiodic. To see this suppose that P $ is in
state st at time t. Suppose further that both players make errors at the investment and
the bargaining stage for m consecutive periods. After this m periods the state st+m
consists entirely of random demands. Consequently the state st+m can be every state in
S which implies irreducibility. Clearly the same state can also be reached after m+ 1
periods of consecutive errors which implies aperiodicity.
From the theory of Markov Processes it follows that there exists a unique stationary
distribution µ$ of the Markov process P $ where µ$(s) is the cumulative relative frequency
with which a state s will occur if the process P $ runs for a very long time.
In the following analysis of the long run behaviour of the investment bargaining process
I use the equilibrium concept of stochastic stability introduced by Foster and Young
(1990).
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Definition 1. A state s ∈ S is stochastically stable if lim$→0 µ$(s) > 0.
Let S∗ denote the set of stochastically stable states. For very small error probabilities
% the process P $ will be in S∗ most of the time. This equilibrium notion allows for
constant perturbations of the best response dynamic.
To compute the stochastically stable states the techniques pioneered by Freidlin and
Wentzel (1984) and adapted by Young (1993a,b) will be applied.
The probability of a one period transition from a state s to a different state s′ under
P $ is denoted by P $ss′ . A state s
′ is called a successor of s if P $ss′ > 0.
Let s′ be a successor of s under P $. The resistance between s and s′, r(s, s′) is given
by the number of errors that are necessary for a transition from s to s′. Let a path
ρ from s1 to s2 be a sequence of one period transitions that leads from s1 to s2. The
resistance of a path ρ is the sum of the resistances of the one-period transitions in ρ.
For any two states s1 and s2, let r(s1, s2) be the least total number of mistakes in any
path that leads from s1 to s2.
It has been shown in Young (1993a) that the set of stochastically stable states with
respect to P $ is a subset of the so called recurrent communication classes Si of P $.
Definition 2. The set S of recurrent communication classes Si of P $ is defined by the
following properties.
1. From every state s ∈ S there exists a path with zero resistance which leads to at
least one state that lies in a recurrent communication class.
2. For every two states s1 and s2 in any recurrent communication class Si there exists
a path from s1 to s2 with zero resistance .
3. Every path that leads from a state s1 that lies in a recurrent communication class
Si to any state s2 that lies outside this recurrent communication has resistance
strictly greater than zero.
Let P 0 denote the Markov chain that is determined exclusively by the best response
behaviour of players. This Markov chain is called the unperturbed investment bargaining
process. A transition that has positive probability under P 0 has zero resistance under P $.
This allows to compute the recurrent communication classes of P $ using the properties
of P 0.
Define a graph G as follows. There is a vertex for every recurrent communication
class Si of P $ and a directed edge from every vertex to every other vertex. The “weight”
or resistance of any directed edge Si → Sj is the least resistance of all paths that start
in Si and end in Sj .
Let an i-Tree be a collection of edges in G such that from every Vertex Sj &=i there is a
unique directed path to Si, and there are no cycles. Let Ti be the set of all i-Trees
Definition 3. The stochastic potential of a recurrent communication class Si is the
least resistance among all i-Trees:
γi = min
T∈Ti
∑
(s,s′)∈T
r(s, s′).
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The elements of a recurrent communication class Si are stochastically stable if Si has
the least stochastic potential among all Sj ∈ S.
The further analysis will also use the concept of conventions. Write (I, x, J, y)l for a
sequence of length l that consists of identical records (I, x, J, y)
Definition 4. A state s ∈ S is a convention σ = (I, ξ, J, VIJ − ξ)m with I ∈ I, J ∈ J,
and ξ ∈ XIJ if it consists of m identical records and the demands of the players are
compatible. A convention is stable if it is an absorbing state of the Markov process P 0.
Stable conventions are the only states where all possible beliefs of players coincide
with the best response behaviour of their opponents. Thus as long as the process is in a
stable convention beliefs of players will constantly be confirmed.
4. One-sided Investment
This section deals with the case of one-sided investment. This case has been the centre of
the discussions concerning the hold-up problem.The present model describes a situation
of one-sided investment if players from one population have only one feasible investment
level.
For simplicity assume that there only exist two investment levels, high investment,
H and low investment, L. The number of investment levels is not crucial, but must be
finite. Assume further without loss of generality that players from B can only choose low
investment (J = {L}) while players from A can choose between high and low investment
(I = {H,L}).
In the remainder of this section I concentrate on the case where high investment is
efficient. This clearly is the relevant case for the discussion of the hold-up problem. In
the present model high investment is said to be efficient if
VH − CH > VL − CL. (3)
As a point of reference briefly consider the traditional case where the surplus VI is split
among both players according to the Nash-bargaining rule which attributes VI/2 to each
player. Clearly in this case a player α will choose high investment if VH2 −CH > VL2 −CL.
It follows that the hold-up problem would lead to an inefficient, low level of investment if
VH − VL ∈ (CH − CL, 2CH − 2CL).
The following section will present an evolutionary analysis of the case where VH > VL
and CH > CL which obviously is a necessary condition for the hold-up problem to arise.
For simplicity the cost associated with low investment CL is assumed to be zero for both
players. To shorten the notation, J and CL will be suppressed.
4.1. Stable High Investment
In this part it will be shown that for the case of one-sided efficient investment all recurrent
communication classes of P $ consist of a stable convention with high investment. This
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implies that all stochastically stable states must be associated with high investment.
In the next part on surplus distribution it is then shown that there exists a unique
stochastically stable convention.
Consequently the present model predicts that the evolutionary dynamics lead to a
situation where the efficient investment level is chosen and consequently the hold-up
problem is solved in the sense that the efficient investment level is chosen. This is
consistent with the Results of Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002). It will
become clear, however, that their results rest on quite different arguments than the
results that are presented in this paper. While in their models efficiency can only
be guaranteed when the concept of stochastic stability is evoked, in this model the
unperturbed process converges to efficient outcomes directly. This is formulated in the
following Theorem:
Theorem 5. Let investment be efficient and let the sample lengths of both players be
smaller or equal to m/2. Then from any initial state s the unperturbed bargaining process
P 0 converges almost surely to a stable convention where investment is high.
The expression “almost surely” is used as in Young (1993b) and describes the fact that
the probability that P 0 does not converge to a stable convention with high investment
goes to zero as the number of periods goes to infinity. The Proof of the Theorem will
use several Lemmata. The first Lemma describes the investment behaviour of players α:
Lemma 6. If the sample A that is drawn by player α consists of identical records (I, ξ, y),
then α will choose high investment if, and only if, y < VH − CH .
Proof. Consider the best response of α drawing A. Since all records in A are identical,
α expects β to play y with probability 1 at the bargaining stage i.e. F (y|A) = 1.
Consequently the best response of α at the bargaining stage is to make a compatible
demand x = VI − y if this demand can possibly yield a positive payoff, i.e. VI − y ≥ δ.
Since by assumption no player can obtain a negative share of the gross surplus, it follows
from equation 2 that for the case of one-sided investment the expected payoff of choosing
an investment level is given by
max
x
(E(piα(x)|I, A)) = max{VI − y, 0}− CI .
Because investment is efficient, it follows from equation 3 that VH−y−CH > VL−y−CL
for all y. Consequently max{VH − y, 0}− CH > max{VL − y, 0}− 0 holds if, and only
if, y < VH − CH in which case α will choose high investment.
The condition that A consists of identical records may seem limiting. It will be shown
later, however, that this special case allows to characterise the set of stable conventions.
This clearly is the case because every sample that is drawn from a convention by definition
consists of identical records.
This proof rests on the assumptions about how the players form their beliefs. Since
the beliefs of players α are unconditional on their own investment decision, they believe
that their opponents β will make their demands according to the same distribution
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irrespective of the investment that α chooses. Because in this sense the demands of β
are given, players α expect to maximise their payoff by maximising the surplus. This of
course only holds conditional on the fact that α expects to get a positive payoff at all,
which is a sufficient condition for high investment.
The next step is to characterise the set of stable equilibria with high investment:
Lemma 7. Let ΣH denote the set of stable conventions where investment is high. If
investment is efficient, then ΣH is the set of conventions σ = (H, ξ, VH − ξ) with
ξ ∈ X ∩ [CH + δ, VH − δ].
Proof. Consider a convention σ with high investment and some division ξ.
From Lemma 6 it follows that α will choose high investment if, and only if, VH − ξ <
VH − CH . This condition also implies that the best response of α at the bargaining
stage is ξ.
For β to play VH − ξ with probability one it must be the case that VH − ξ > 0.
Together this shows that if σ is a convention with high investment, then the unique
best response of both players is (H, ξ, VH − ξ) if, and only if, ξ ∈ X ∩ [CH + δ, VH − δ].
It follows that ΣH is the set of absorbing states with high investment of the unperturbed
investment bargaining process P 0 .
Lemma 7 expresses that every convention with high investment is stable if both players
get a strictly positive net gain. The proof is a simple application of Lemma 6 and the
fact that α and β will only make a demand with probability one if their expected payoff
from this demand is strictly greater than the payoff of every other demand.
In the following proofs of Lemma 8 and Theorem 5 it will be assumed that both
players draw samples of the same length, i.e. a = b = k. This assumption is made for
convenience and is not crucial. The assumption that 2max{a, b} ≤ m would be crucial
to the argument used. References to probabilities always refer to probabilities of the
unperturbed investment bargaining process P 0.
Lemma 8. Suppose that both players draw samples of length k and that 2k ≤ m. Let S′
be the set of states where the last k records (I, x, y) are identical and the best response of
α drawing a sample that consists of these last k records is (H,VH − y). For any initial
state s ∈ S there is a positive probability under P 0 of transition within finite time to a
state in S′.
Proof. Suppose that the process is in state st = [(I, x, y)t−m+1, . . . , (I, x, y)t] at time t.
Let At denote the sample of the records that are the last k records in st. Distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: Suppose that the best response of α to At implies low investment.
Suppose that α and β both sample At in period the periods from t+1 to t+k inclusive,
which has a positive probability. This is possible because by assumption 2k ≤ m. Then
α will play its best response (L, x) and β will play its best response y. At the bargaining
stage α and β will by assumption play a demand that is compatible with some demand
of their respective opponent. Since α will play low investment, α and β will choose
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demands that are lower than the potential surplus associated with low investment i.e.
x, y ∈ X ∩ [δ, VL − δ].
Let At+k denote the last last k records in st+k. Observe that from the argument
above it follows that At+k consists entirely of records (L, x, y) where β made demands
y that were smaller than VL. Consider the best response of α drawing At+k. Because
investment is efficient and y < VL, it follows from equation 3 that y < VH − CH . Then
it follows from Lemma 6 that α will choose high investment. Because y < VH , it is clear
that α will demand VH − y at the bargaining stage.
Case 2: Suppose that the best response of α to At implies high investment.
Suppose that α and β both sample At in period t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive, which again
has a positive probability. Then α and β will play their best response (H,x, y) in periods
t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive. Let At+k denote the last k records in st+k that consist entirely
of records (H,x, y). If the best response of α to At+k implies low investment, then st+k
is a state to which case 1 applies.
If the best response of α to At+k implies high investment, then it follows from Lemma
6 that y < VH − CH , which implies that the best response of α at the bargaining stage
must be VH − y.
Together the Cases 1 and 2 prove the Lemma.
This proof of Lemma 8 shows that if investment was low for sufficiently many periods,
then players α will choose high investment with positive probability. This implies that
there do not exist stable conventions that are not elements of ΣH . The proof of this rests
on the fact that if investment is low, then by assumption players β will make demands
y that are lower than the total gross surplus VL. After enough periods players α will
come to believe that the demands of β will be indeed smaller than VL. If this is the case,
however, then it has been shown in Lemma 6 that α will find it profitable to choose high
investment.
Lemma 8 also shows that from any initial state there exists a positive probability that
play in the next k periods is identical. This implies that every recurrent communication
classes of P $ must include such a state. This follows from the fact that the same sample
can be drawn for k periods because by assumption 2k ≤ m.
This technical result will be used to complete the proof of Theorem 5. Starting from a
state that fulfils the properties derived in Lemma 8, a sequence of states is constructed
where each transition has positive probability and that leads to a stable convention with
high investment. The fact that the set of states is finite completes the argument from
any initial state the process P 0 converges almost surely to an absorbing state with high
investment.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider a state st in period t where the last k records (I, x, y) are
identical and the the best response of α drawing a sample of that consists of the last k
records is (H,VH − y). Let At denote the sample of the last k records in st.
Let α and β sample At in the periods from t + 1 to t + k inclusive. The demand
by α will then be VH − y > CH . Thus with positive probability α and β will choose
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(H,VH − y, VH − x) in the periods t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive. Let Bt+k denote the sample
of the last k records in st+k.
In period t+ k + 1, let α sample At and let β sample Bt+k. Note that this is possible
since 2k ≤ m and At and Bt+k together consist of the last 2k records in st+k. The best
response of α to At must still be (H,VH). Since all demands from α in Bt+k are VH − y
and α plays high investment, β’s best reply is y. Thus (H,VH)− y, y) is played in period
t+ k + 1 with positive probability.
In period t+ k + 2 the first record of At may have disappeared from the state st+k+2
(if m = 2k). But since β has demanded y in period t+ k + 1, there still exists a sample
of length k in st+k+2 in which β always demanded y. Let this be the sample of α
in period t + 2k + 2 and let the sample of β continue to be Bt+2k. Thus in period
t + k + 2, (H,VH − y, y) will be played with positive probability. By an analogous
argument (H,VH − y, y) will be played with positive probability in period t+ k + 3 to
t+ 2k inclusive.
Thus in period t+2k the last k records in st+2k consist entirely of records (H,VH−y, y).
Let At+2k denote the last k records in st+2k. Let α and β sample At+2k in period t+2k+1
to t+2k+(m− k) inclusive. Clearly the best response of α and β will be (H,VH − y, y).
Thus there is a positive probability that in period t+ 2k + (m − k), s′t+2k+(m−k) will
consist exclusively of records (H,VH − y, y). Since by construction α gets a positive net
gain i.e. VH − y > CH , Lemma 7 implies that s′t+2k+(m−k) is a stable convention with
high investment.
Together with Lemma 8 this shows that for any given state s there exists a positive
probability of reaching a stable convention with high investment within finite time. The
fact that the state space S is finite implies that as the number of periods goes to infinity
the probability of reaching a stable convention with high investment goes to one. Thus
the Proof is complete.
Theorem 5 implies that the set S of recurrent communication classes of the perturbed
investment bargaining process P $ consists entirely of stable conventions. From Theorem 2
of Young (1993a) it follows that the set of stochastically stable states consists exclusively
of stable conventions with high investment.
Corollary 9. The set of stochastically stable equilibria S∗ must be a subset of the set of
stable conventions ΣH .
Proof. From Theorem 5 and Lemma 7 it follows that if investment is efficient, then
from any state s ∈ S there exists a path with positive probability under P 0 to a stable
convention with high investment. This implies that every recurrent communication class
of P $ must contain a stable convention because of property 3 in definition 2. Because
all stable conventions are absorbing states of P 0, it follows from property 2 of definition
2 that all recurrent communication classes are stable conventions.
Theorem 2 in Young (1993a) states that the set of stochastically stable equilibria
S∗ must be a subset of set recurrent communication classes of the perturbed Markov
process S which completes the proof.
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4.2. Surplus distribution
Corollary 9 confirms the results of Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002) that
the stochastically stable equilibrium is a convention with high, efficient investment. But
the proofs of the corresponding Proposition 4.1 in Tröger (2002) and Proposition 4 in
Ellingsen and Robles (2002) also imply that as δ → 0 the share of the investing player
converges to
ξ = max
{
max
I∈I\I∗
(VI − CI) + CI∗ , VI∗2
}
, (4)
where I∗ ≡ argmaxI∈I(VI −CI) is the most efficient investment level. Thus the invest-
ing player either gets the symmetric Nash bargaining solution VI∗/2 or the maximum
potential net surplus VI − CI of the next efficient investment level. Thus if the set of
possible investment levels represents a sufficiently fine grid, then almost all the surplus
will be attributed to the investing player.
To understand this observe that in these models a stable convention can be associated
with almost any investment level I ∈ I. This is due to the fact that the expected payoffs
of the investment levels I0 . . . IN depend on the independent distributions FˆI(y). Thus
a convention σI = (I, x, VI − x) with I )= I∗ is stable if
max
x
E(piα(x)|I, FˆI) = max
x
(xFˆI(VI − x|A)− CI) > max
x
E(piα(x)|I ′, FˆI′)
for all I ′ ∈ I \ I.
If this is the case, then an investment level I ′ will only be chosen if a player α makes
an error at the investment stage. Because of the specific assumption made in Ellingsen
and Robles (2002) and Tröger (2002), this also implies that α will also make an error at
the bargaining stage. Thus if a player α chooses I ′ by error, she will make a random
demand at the bargaining stage. This implies that the beliefs FˆI′ of players β will change
by some random demand. Because I ′ is only chosen by error, this change of FˆI′ will be
permanent in the absence of future errors.
Thus the absorbing state s which is associated with the stable convention σI will move
to another absorbing state s′ that is also associated with σI but differs in terms of FˆI′ .
Moreover a number of such errors can change the beliefs of players FˆI′ in such a way
that maxxE(piα(x)|I ′, FˆI′) > maxxE(piα(x)|I, FˆI) which will lead to a displacement of
the convention σI and will possibly lead to a state that is associated with another stable
convention σI′ . Consequently σI can not be the unique stochastically stable convention
because it can be displaced by a sequence of states that are connected by single errors.
Now consider a convention σ∗ = (I∗, x, VI∗ − x) where x > maxI∈I\I∗(VI −CI) +CI∗ .
Evidently this implies that maxxE(piα(x)|I∗, FˆI∗) > maxxE(piα(x)|I, FˆI) for all possible
beliefs FˆI and investment levels I ∈ I \ I∗. Thus such a convention can not be displaced
by any number of errors a the investment stage. It can of course be displaced by errors
that occur at the bargaining stage after the choice of the investment level I∗. But given
that the beliefs FˆI are based on sufficiently long samples of play, more than one error is
necessary to displace the convention σ∗ in this way. Also as long as the convention σ∗ is
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in place a single error at the bargaining stage will not change the beliefs FˆI∗ permanently
because I∗ is chosen every period. Thus the unique stochastically stable convention will
fulfil the condition of equation 4 where the dependence on the Nash bargaining solution
follows from Young (1993b).
In the present model the net gain x − CI that the investing player obtains in a
stochastically stable convention does not depend on the net surplus of other investment
levels. Thus the nature of the grid that is represented by I does not influence the
equilibrium distribution of the surplus. The reason for this is that the expectations
about bargaining behaviour are the same for all investment levels. This is why the
assumption of only two investment levels is not crucial in the present paper.
The distribution of the gross surplus VI will be determined by the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution as long as this does result in a positive net surplus for the investing
player. The weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution depend on the relative
length of the sample sizes a and b of the players α and β respectively. Hence the
predictions about the evolution of surplus distribution in bargaining situations by Young
(1993b) are replicated in the present model.
Theorem 10. Let investment be efficient, let a and b be sufficiently large, and let
a ≤ b ≤ m2 hold. There exists at least one and at most two generically stochastically
stable conventions. As δ → 0 they converge to
ξ = max
{
argmax
x
((x)a/m(VH − x)b/m), CH
}
.
Clearly because of the assumption a ≤ b this Theorem does not describe all relevant
cases. It encompasses, however, the case considered by Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and
Tröger (2002) who assume that a = b. The characterisation of the general case remains
for further research.
The Proof of this Theorem will largely rely on the arguments of the Proof of Theorem
3 in Young (1993b). To establish that these arguments can be used in the present case
the following Lemma will be used.
Lemma 11. If investment is one-sided, then the behaviour of players at time t depends
only on the distribution of demands x and y in st.
Proof. From equation 2 it follows that the expected payoff of a player α choosing an
investment level E(piα(I)|A) reduces to maxxE(piα(x)|I, A). The bargaining behaviour
of α and β is given by equation 1 and the analogon for β. Because F (y|A) and F (x|B)
are independent the investments taken in A and B respectively the play of α and β
depends exclusively on the history of demands that have been made by players α and
β.
Note that this implies that for one-sided investment past investment decisions do not
influence the behaviour of players.
Proof of Theorem 10. From Theorem 2 in Young (1993a) it follows that the set of
stochastically stable states must be a subset of S. From Lemma 11 it follows that the
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transition from one state to another depends only on the history of bargaining demands.
Consequently only errors at the bargaining stage have to be considered to determine the
minimal number of errors that is necessary to displace a stable convention and move into
the basin of attraction of another stable convention. This allows us to use Lemma 1 in
Young (1993b): The minimum number of error that is necessary to displace a convention
(H, ξ, VH − ξ)m in S is given by the smallest integer that is greater or equal than
rδ(ξ) = min
{
a(1− ξ − δ
ξ
), b(1− VH − ξ − δ
VH − ξ ), a
ξ
VH − δ
}
,
which is denoted by *rδ+.
If players β make mistakes ξ′ that are higher than the conventional demands ξ, then
the minimal number of mistakes that is necessary to make a player α choose ξ′ is given
by a ξξ′ . This expression is minimised if ξ
′ = VH − δ which yields the third term of rδ.
If players α make mistakes ξ′ that are higher than the conventional demands ξ, then
the minimal number of mistakes that is necessary to make a player β choose ξ′ is given
by b(1 − VH−ξ′VH−ξ ). This expression is minimised by ξ′ = ξ + δ which yields the second
term of rδ.
If players β make mistakes ξ′ that are lower than the conventional demands ξ, then
the minimal number of mistakes that is necessary to make a player α choose ξ′ is given
by a(1− ξ′ξ ). This expression is minimised by ξ′ = ξ− δ which yields the first term of rδ.
Of course also players α make mistakes ξ′ that are lower than the conventional
demands ξ. But for b ≥ a the minimal number of such mistakes that is necessary to
make a player β choose ξ′, given by bVH−ξξ′ , is never strictly smaller than a(1 − ξ−δξ ).
Hence these mistakes are irrelevant for the discussion of stochastic stability.
A formal derivation of rδ(x) would be analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 of Young
(1993b). Note, however, that the expressions by Young differ from those above because
he assumes VH = 1 and a ≥ b instead of b ≥ a.
Because b
(
1− VH−ξ−δVH−ξ
)
and a ξVH−δ are strictly increasing in ξ and a(1 −
ξ−δ
ξ ) is
strictly decreasing in ξ, rδ is maximised by a unique value ξ∗or two adjunct values ξ∗
and ξ∗ + δ. To construct a minimal i-Tree on S distinguish three cases:
Case 1: Suppose that CH < ξ∗ and suppose that ξ∗ = argmaxξ∈X rδ is unique. Now
follow the Proof of Lemma 2 in Young (1993b). Construct an i-tree Tδ with a vertex for
every stable convention and with root (H, ξ∗, VH − ξ∗)m ∈ ΣH as follows:
1. For every (H, ξ, VH − ξ)m ∈ S with ξ > ξ∗ put the directed edge ((H, ξ, VH −
ξ)m, (H, ξ − δ, VH − ξ + δ)m) in Tδ and let its weight be
⌈
a(1− ξ−δξ )
⌉
.
2. For every (H, ξ, VH − ξ)m ∈ S with ξ < ξ∗ and b
(
1− VH−ξ−δVH−ξ
)
≤ a ξVH−δ put the
directed edge ((H, ξ, VH − ξ)m, (H, ξ + δ, VH − ξ + δ)m) in Tδ and let its weight be⌈
b(1− VH−ξ−δVH−ξ )
⌉
.
3. For every (H, ξ, VH − ξ)m ∈ S with ξ < ξ∗ and b
(
1− VH−ξ−δVH−ξ
)
> a ξVH−δ put
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the directed edge ((H, ξ, VH − ξ)m, (H,VH − δ, δ)m) in Tδ and let its weight be⌈
a( ξVH−δ )
⌉
.
This tree is constructed such that it has the minimal stochastic potential among all
i-Trees on S. Because its root is chosen such that it maximises rδ, the number of errors
that is necessary to displace this convention is higher than for any other stable convention
if a and b are sufficiently large. For a more detailed exposition compare the proof of
Lemma 2 in Young (1993b)3.
Case 2: Suppose that CH ≤ ξ∗ and that rδ(ξ) is maximised by two neighbouring
values in X, ξ∗ and ξ∗ + δ. Simply construct a i-Tree as above for each of them. By
similar arguments as above these i-Trees have minimum stochastic potential.
Case 3: Suppose now that CH ≥ ξ∗. Construct an i-Tree with a vertex for every stable
convention and root (H,CH + δ, VH − CH − δ)m as follows:
For every (H,x, VH−x)m ∈ S put the directed ((H,x, VH−x)m, (H,x−δ, VH−x+δ)m)
in Tδ and let its weight be
⌈
a(1− ξ−δξ )
⌉
. By construction this i-Tree has minimum
stochastic potential among all i-Trees on S. Because rδ is decreasing in ξ for ξ≥ξ∗, it
follows that the number of errors that is necessary to displace (H,CH+δ, VH−CH−δ)m
is higher than for any other stable convention.
Together with Theorem 2 in Young (1993a) this implies that for CH ≥ ξ∗, (H,CH +
δ, VH −CH − δ)m and for CH < ξ∗, (H, ξ∗, VH − ξ∗) and possibly (H, ξ∗+ δ, VH − ξ∗− δ)
are the unique generically stochastically stable conventions. Together with Lemma 3 in
Young (1993b) that shows that limδ→∞ argmaxξ∈X rδ(ξ) equals the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution, this completes the proof of the Theorem.
This Theorem shows that in the present model the distribution of the surplus does not
favour the investing player. In contrast for a ≤ b the net gain ξ∗ − CH of the investing
player is strictly smaller than the net gain VH − ξ∗ of the non-investing player. This
confirms the traditional results of the literature on the hold-up problem that emphasises
the possibility that the investing player is “ripped off” by the other player.
Indeed Theorem 10 might be seen as describing an intermediate case. On the one
hand, the evolutionary learning process ensures that investment will be high and that
the investing player will not get a negative net surplus. This confirms the insights that
evolution can overcome the underinvestment in the hold-up problem and thereby solve
the efficiency problem. On the other hand, it allows for the non-investing party to ensure
more than half of the net surplus for himself. Consequently the investing party still has
an incentive to search for possibilities that allow a different distribution of the surplus.
5. Two-sided Investment
While one-sided investment features prominently in the literature there is no reason
to believe that in general relation specific investment is one-sided. As an example one
3Note that the tree described in Young 1993 is a mirror image of the x-Tree constructed above. The
reason is that b ≥ a is assumed instead of a ≥ b. Also note that in the paper by Young the sample
length of players α and β is defined by am and bm respectively.
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L H
L VLL2 − CL , VLL2 − CL VHL2 − CL , VHL2 − CH
H VLH2 − CH , VLH2 − CL VHH2 −CH , VHH2 −CH
Figure 1: Strategic Model of the Two-sided Hold-up Problem.
might think about an employee who invests effort to acquire a firm specific skill and
uses costly resources of the firm to do so.
This section will concentrate on the case where high investment by both players is
efficient, which clearly is the appropriate frame of reference for discussing the hold-up
problem. It is again assumed that there only exist two investment levels, H and L. It is
also assumed that the investment by players from A and B is symmetric in the sense
that VHL = VLH . This is in line with the assumptions made in Dawid and MacLeod
(2001, 2008). Investment is said to be efficient if
VHH − 2CH > max{VHL − CH − CL, VLL − 2CLL}. (5)
The focus on one-sided investment might be due to the fact that for many traditional
bargaining models the nature of the hold-up problem is the same for one- and two-sided
investment. As a point of reference consider again that the surplus VIJ is split among the
two player according to the Nash bargaining rule. If the players from both populations
are identical, then the game can be represented by the matrix in Figure 1.
High investment by both players will be a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, VHH2 −CH >
VHL
2 −CL. Thus if VHH − 2CH > VLL − 2CL is satisfied, it follows from equation 5 that
the hold-up problem would lead to inefficient, low investment if
VHH − VHL ∈ (CH − CL, 2CH − 2CL). (6)
Evidently this is very similar to the condition for one-sided investment (equation 3).
Figure 2 depicts the parameter values of the hold-up problem for CL = 0 which occurs
in the areas B and C.
This similarity of the result does not carry over to the evolutionary models in the spirit
of Tröger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002). Dawid and MacLeod (2001) show that
if investment is two-sided, no unique stochastically stable convention with high investment
might exist. The intuition behind their result is relatively straightforward. Consider a
stable convention with high investment of both players, σ = (H,x,H, VHH − x). If σ
is a stable convention, then the beliefs of the players must be such that choosing high
investment yields the highest expected payoff. Because the the fact that σ is a stable
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VLL VHH
VHH
2
VLL−VHH
2
0
VLL
CH
A
B
C
Figure 2: Parameters of the hold-up problem.
The concept of this Figure is due to Dawid and MacLeod (2008).
convention implies that both players believe that q(L) = 0, this is equal to
max
x
E(piα(x)|H,H, FˆHH(y)) ≡ max
x
(xFˆHH(VHH − x)− CH)
> max
x
E(piα(x)|L,H, FˆLH(y)) ≡ max
x
(xFˆLH(VLH − x)− CL),
and the analogous condition for β.
As explained in the discussion of Corollary 9, FˆLH(.) can take a random form for both
players due to errors at the investment stage, which imply errors at the bargaining stage.
Thus a convention is the unique stochastically stable convention only if it is stable for
all possible FˆLH(.).
Clearly the maximum expected payoff from low investment that is compatible with
some beliefs FˆLH(.) and q(H) = 0 is VHL − CL. Consequently a convention can only be
stable for all possible FˆLH(.) if x− CH > VHL − CL and VHH − x− CH > VHL − CL.
This can only be the case if
VHH − VHL > 2CH − 2CL + VHL,
which because of equation 6 implies that there would be no hold-up problem in the
traditional strategic model. This implies that there does not exist a unique stochastically
stable convention for the relevant range of parameters and hence no coordination in the
long run.
Thus Dawid and MacLeod (2001) show that in a situation with two-sided investment
the hold-up problem might turn out to be more severe in an evolutionary framework.
This point also made in Dawid and MacLeod (2008). In this paper the probabilities of
making an error at the investment and the bargaining stage are independent. Moreover
the probability of making an error at the investment stage is assumed not to converge
towards zero while the probability of making an error at the bargaining stage converges
to zero. In this setup a unique stochastically stable bargaining norm always exist. But
the set of parameters for which this stochastically stable norm is associated with efficient
high investment is strictly smaller than in the strategic model.
Different to this in the present model all stochastically stable conventions are associated
with high efficient investment by both players for a relevant range of parameters. It will
be shown that this is the case for what I shall call unilaterally efficient investment.
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Investment is said to be unilaterally efficient if, high investment by only one player is
more efficient, then low investment by both players. Formally investment is unilaterally
efficient if, it is efficient and
VHL − CH > VLL − CL. (7)
The parameters for which investment is unilaterally efficient correspond to the area A
and B in Figure 2.
Theorem 12. Let investment be unilaterally efficient and let the sample lengths of both
players be k ≤ m/3. Then from any initial state s the unperturbed bargaining process P 0
converges almost surely to a stable convention where investment is high.
The proof of this Theorem is similar to the proof of the one-sided case. For simplicity
CL = 0 is assumed again which is not crucial, however. The following Lemma is the
equivalent of Lemma 6.
Lemma 13. Suppose that investment is unilaterally efficient and that the sample A
consists of k identical records (I, x, J, y). If player α draws A, then α will play high
investment if, and only if, y < VHJ − CH . If player β draws A, then β will play high
investment if, and only if, x < VIH − CH .
Proof. Consider the best response of α drawing A. Since all records in A are identical,
α expects β to play J and y with probability one. Consequently the best response of α
at the bargaining stage is to play x = VIJ − y if VIJ − y ≥ δ.
From equation 2 it follows that the expected payoff for α of playing an investment
level I ′ is
max
x
(E(piα(x)|I ′, J, A)) = max{VIJ − y, 0}− CI .
If JA = H, then because investment is unilaterally efficient which implies efficiency it
follows from equation 5 that max{VHH − y, 0} − CH > max{VLH − y, 0} − 0 holds if,
and only if, y < VHH − CH in which case α will choose high investment.
If conversely JA = L, then because investment is unilaterally efficient equation 7
implies that max{VHL−y, 0}−CH > max{VLL−y, 0}−0 if, and only if, y < VHL−CH
in which case α will choose high investment.
Together this implies that α will chooses high investment if, and only if, y < VHJ−CH .
Because the players from A and B are symmetric, β chooses high investment if, and
only if, x < VIH − CH .
In the remainder of this section use the following definition to shorten notation:
Definition 14. Let At denote the last k records in a state st.
The following three Lemmata will show that from any initial state there exists a
positive probability of reaching a state in ΣHH within finite time. The condition that
both players sample k ≤ m/3 records is not referred explicitly. It is, however, used
implicitly and is sufficient to ensure that the proofs of the following Lemmata are valid.
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Lemma 15. For any state st where At consists of identical records (L, x, L, y) there
exists a positive probability of transition to a stable convention with high investment
within finite time.
Proof. Distinguish 2 cases:
Case 1: Assume that x or y in At are larger than CH . Then without loss of generality
assume that x > CH .
Suppose that α and β sample At = (L, x, L, y)k in period t+1 to t+k inclusive. Because
x and y are smaller than VLL and investment is unilaterally efficient, x, y < VHL − CH .
Thus Lemma 13 implies that both players will play high investment. Consequently at
the bargaining stage α will choose VHH − y and β will choose VHH − x.
Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At+k = (H,VHH −
y,H.VHH−x)k and β samples At. Because of x > CH , Lemma 13 implies high investment
for player α. Player β will also choose high investment again. Thus at the bargaining
stage β will choose VHH − x again and α will choose VHH − (VHH − x) = x.
Suppose that in period t + 2k + 1 to t + 3k inclusive α and β sample At+2k =
(H,x,H, VHH − x)k. Because x < VLL, player β will choose high investment. Player α
will also choose high investment again since VHH − x < VHH − CH . At the bargaining
stage α demands x and β demands VHH − x.
Thus At+3k equals At+2k after both players have sampled At+2k . Consequently if
both player sample the last k records in every period, then st+2k will converge to a
stable convention in m− 2k periods.
Case 2: Assume that x and y in At are smaller or equal than CH .
Suppose that α and β sample At = (L, x, L, y)k in period t+1 to t+k inclusive. Then
because x and y are smaller than VLL and investment is unilaterally efficient, Lemma
13 implies that both players will play high investment. Consequently at the bargaining
stage α will choose VHH − y and β will choose VHH − x.
Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At+k = (H,VHH −
y,H.VHH − x)k and β samples At. Because from x ≤ CH , it follows that VHH − x ≥
VHH − CH , Lemma 13 implies low investment for player α. Player β will choose high
investment again. Thus at the bargaining stage β chooses VLH − x. Because investment
is efficient, VHH − x > VHL which implies that α makes a random demand y′.
Suppose that in period t+2k+1 to t+3k inclusive α samples At+2k = (L, y′, H.VLH−
x)k and β samples At. Because investment is efficient, VLH−x < VHH−CH and Lemma
13 implies that α will choose high investment. Player β will choose high investment again.
Thus at the bargaining stage α demands VHH − (VLH − x) and β demands VHH − x.
Suppose that in period t+ 3k + 1 to t+ 4k inclusive α samples At+2k and β samples
At+3k = (H,VHH− (VLH−x), H, VHH−x)k. Because investment is unilaterally efficient,
VLH − VLL > CH and since x < VLL, it follows that VHH − (VLH − x) < VHH − CH .
Thus Lemma 13 implies that player β will choose high investment. Player α will again
choose high investment. At the bargaining stage α will again demand VHH − (VLH − x)
and β will demand VHH − (VHH − (VLH − x)) = VLH − x.
Suppose that in period t + 4k + 1 to t + 5k inclusive α and β sample At+4k =
(H,VHH − (VLH − x), H, VLH − x)k. Since α and β both face the same investment and
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demand distributions as in period t+ 3k + 1 to t+ 4k, both will choose high investment
again and make the same demands at the bargaining stage. Thus if both players sample
the last k records in every period, then st+5k will converge to a stable convention with
high investment in m− 2k periods.
Lemma 16. For any state st where At consists of identical records (H,x, L, y) or
(L, xH, y) there exists a positive probability of transition to a stable convention with high
investment within finite time.
Proof. Because A and B are symmetric, assume without loss of generality that At =
(H,x, L, y)k. Distinguish 4 cases:
Case 1: Assume that y < VHL − CH and x > CH . Suppose that α and β sample At
in period t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive. Because of Lemma 13, y < VHL − CH implies that
player α will choose high investment. Because investment is efficient and x < VHL which
implies x < VHH − CH , it follows from Lemma 13 that β will choose high investment.
At the bargaining stage α will demand VHH − y and β will demand VHH − x.
Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At+k = (H,VHH −
y,H, VHH − x)k and β samples At. Because x > CH , Lemma 13 implies that α will
choose high investment. Player β will again choose high investment. At the bargaining
stage α will demand VHH − (VHH − x) = x and β will demand VHH − x.
Suppose that α and β sample At+2k = (H,x,H, VHH − x)k. Because x > CH and
investment is efficient, VHH − x < VHH − CH and because x < VHL and investment
is efficient, x < VHH − CH . Thus Lemma 13 implies that α and β will choose high
investment. At the bargaining stage α will demand x and β will demand VHH − x.
Since this is identical to the records in At+2k, the state st+2k will converge to a stable
convention with high investment if both players sample the last k records in the next
m− k periods.
Case 2: Assume that y ≥ VHL − CH and x ≤ CH . Suppose that α and β sample
At = (H,x, L, y)k in period t+1 to t+k inclusive. Because of Lemma 13, y ≥ VHL−CH
implies that player α will choose low investment. Because investment is efficient and
x < VHL which implies x < VHH − CH , it follows from Lemma 13 that β will choose
high investment. At the bargaining stage α will demand VHL − y and β will choose
VHL − x.
Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At and β samples
At+k = (L, VHL− y,H, VHL− x)k. Because x ≤ CH , VHL− x ≥ VHL−CH and Lemma
13 imply that β chooses low investment. Player α will choose low investment as before.
Thus At+2k = (L, x′, L, y′) and Lemma 15 implies that st+2k converges to a stable
convention with high investment with positive probability.
Case 3: Assume that y < VHL − CH and x ≤ CH . Suppose that α and β sample
At = (H,x, L, y)k in period t+1 to t+k inclusive. Because of Lemma 13 y < VHL−CH
implies that player α will choose high investment. Because investment is efficient and
x < VHL which implies x < VHH − CH , it follows from Lemma 13 that β will choose
high investment. At the bargaining stage α will demand VHH − y and β will demand
VHH − x.
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Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At+k = (H,VHH −
y,H, VHH − x)k and β samples At+k. Because x ≤ CH , VHH − x ≥ VHH − CH and
Lemma 13 implies low investment by player α. Player β will choose high investment
as before. Thus at the bargaining stage β will demand VLH − x. Because x ≤ CH
and investment is efficient, VHH − x > VHL. Thus player α will make any demand
x′ ∈ [δ, VLH − δ] with positive probability.
Thus At+2k = (L, x′, H, VLH−x)k. If VLH−x > CH , then suppose that x′ < VHL−CH
in period t+ k + 1 to t+ 2k. Because players in A and B are symmetric, it then follows
from Case 1 that st+2k will converge to a stable convention with high investment with
positive probability.
If VLH − x ≤ CH , then suppose that x′ ≥ VHL − CH in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k.
Because players in A and B are symmetric, it then follows from Case 2 that st+2k will
converge to a stable convention with high investment with positive probability.
Case 4: Assume that y ≥ VHL − CH and x > CH . Suppose that α and β sample
At = (H,x, L, y)k in period t+1 to t+k inclusive. Because of Lemma 13, y ≥ VHL−CH
implies that player α will choose low investment. Because investment is efficient and
x < VHL, β will choose high investment. At the bargaining stage α will demand VHL− y
and β will choose VHL − x.
Suppose that in period t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive α samples At+k = (L, VHL −
y,H, VHL−x)k and β samples At. Because investment is efficient VHL−x < VHH −CH
and thus α will choose high investment. Player β will choose high investment again. At
the bargaining stage α will demand VHH − (VHL − x) and β will demand (VHH − x).
Suppose that in period t+ 2k + 1 to t+ 3k inclusive α samples At+2k = (H,VHH −
(VHL − x), H, VHH − x)k and β samples At. Because x > CH , VHH − x < VHH − CH
and thus α will choose high investment. Player β will choose high investment again. At
the bargaining stage α will demand x and β will demand VHH − x.
Suppose that α and β sample At+3k = (H,x,H, VHH − x)k. Because x < VHL and
investment is efficient, β will choose high investment. Because x > CH , α will also
choose high investment again. At the bargaining stage α will demand x and β will
demand VHH − x. Thus At+3k+1 = At+3k and consequently if α and β sample the last
k records in period t+ 3k + 1 to t+ 2k +m the state st+3k will converge to a stable
convention with high investment.
Together Cases 1 to 4 imply that from every state st with At = (H,x, L, y)k or
At = (L, x,H, y)k there exists a positive probability of transition to a stable convention
with high investment within finite time.
Lemma 17. For any state where At consists of identical records (H,x,H, y) there exists
a positive probability of transition to a stable convention with high investment within
finite time.
Proof. Distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Assume that if α and β sample At = (H,x,H, y)k this does not imply high
investment for both players. Thus if both players sample At in period t + 1 to t + k
inclusive, then At+k will have one of the following forms: (L, x′L, y′), (L, x′, H, y′) or
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(H,x′, L, y′). Then Lemma 15 and 16 together imply that st+k will converge to a stable
convention with high investment with positive probability.
Case 2: Assume that if α and β sample At = (H,x,H, y)k, this implies high investment
for both players. Suppose that both players sample At in period t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive.
At the bargaining stage α will demand VHH − y and β will demand VHH − x.
Suppose that both players sample At+k = (H,VHH − y,H, VHH − x)k in period
t+ k + 1 to t+ 2k inclusive. If this does not imply high investment for both players,
then Lemma 15 and 16 again ensure that st+2k will converge to a stable convention with
high investment with positive probability.
If this is not the case, suppose that α samples At+k and β samples At in period
t + k + 1 to t + 2k inclusive. By construction this implies high investment for both
players. At the bargaining stage α will demand x and β will demand VHH − x.
Suppose that in period t+ 2k + 1 both players sample At+2k = (H,x,H, VHH − x).
By construction this implies high investment for both players. At the bargaining stage
α will demand x and β will demand VHH − x. Thus At+2k+1 = At+2k and consequently
if α and β sample the last k records in period t+ 2k + 1 to t+ k +m the state st+2k
will converge to a stable convention with high investment.
The next Lemma claims that a state where At consists of identical records can be
reached from any possible state.
Lemma 18. For every initial state s the investment bargaining process P 0 moves to
a state s′ where the last k records of the state consist of identical records with positive
probability.
Proof. Suppose that the process is in state st at time t .
Suppose that α and β sample At in period t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive. This implies that
there play is identical in the periods t+ 1 to t+ k inclusive with positive probability.
Thus the last k records in state st+k are identical with positive probability.
Together these Lemmata can be used to prove Theorem 12:
Proof of Theorem 12. Lemmata 15 to 18 together imply that for any given state s there
exist a positive probability of reaching a stable convention with high investment by
both players within finite time. The fact that the state space S is finite completes the
proof.
The next Lemma characterises the set of stable conventions with high investment.
Lemma 19. Let ΣHH denote the set of stable conventions where investment by both
players is high. If investment is efficient, then ΣHH is the set of conventions σ =
(H, ξ, H, VHH − ξ) with ξ ∈ X ∩ [CH + δ, VHH − CH − δ].
Proof. Consider a convention σ with high investment by both players and some division
ξ.
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From Lemma 13 it follows that α will choose high investment if, and only if, VHH−ξ <
VHH − CH . This condition also implies that the best response of α at the bargaining
stage is ξ.
Analogously it follows from Lemma 13 that β will choose high investment if, and
only if, ξ < VHH − CH . This condition also implies that the best response of β at the
bargaining stage is VHH − ξ.
Together this shows that if σ is a convention with high investment, then the unique best
response of both players is (H, ξ, H, VHH−ξ) if, and only if, ξ ∈ X∩[CH+δ, VHH−CH−δ].
It follows that ΣHH is the set of absorbing states with high investment of the unperturbed
investment bargaining process P 0 .
Thus if investment is unilaterally efficient, then every convention is stable if both
players choose high investment and results in a positive payoff for both players.
The fact that the unperturbed investment bargaining process P 0 converges to a stable
convention with high investment allows to state the following Corollary.
Corollary 20. If investment is unilaterally efficient, then the set of stochastically stable
equilibria S∗ is a subset of the set of stable conventions with high investment ΣHH .
Proof. Analogous to the Proof of Corollary 9.
It has thus been shown that as long as for both players choosing high investment is
more efficient than low investment regardless of the investment decision of their opponent,
the evolutionary learning process will lead to a set of states where both players choose
high investment. The distribution of the surplus will be such that no player receives a
negative net surplus.
Consequently the fact that relation specific investment is two-sided does not necessarily
imply that the hold-up problem will occur in an evolutionary setting. A characterisation
of the set of stochastically stable equilibria if investment is not unilaterally efficient
remains for further research though.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that in situations associated with the hold-up problem
an evolutionary learning process will lead to a stable convention where the efficient
investment levels are chosen. This result is obtained, although the players hold beliefs
that lead to conflicting demands at the bargaining stage. The evolutionary learning
process is shown to overcome this conflict. This efficiency result carries over at least
partially to the case of two-sided investment which contradicts the findings of Dawid
and MacLeod (2001, 2008).
But while efficiency is achieved by the evolutionary learning process, the investing
player does not necessarily profit from his own investment: In the case of one-sided
investment the gross surplus is distributed according to the Nash bargaining solution
under the condition that the investing player receives a positive surplus given his
investment. Since the investing player bears the investment costs, his net surplus will
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be smaller than the net surplus of the non-investing player. Thus at the bargaining
stage the costs of investment are partially treated as sunk costs. This contrasts with the
findings of Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Tröger (2002), where evolution leads to a
surplus distribution that would follow from a forward induction argument.
From a methodological point of view the present paper shows that the exact specifica-
tion of a myopic best response is non-trivial in a changing environment. If the set of
feasible actions of the players does not necessarily remain the same, then it becomes
difficult to determine how the actions that have been taken given different action sets
should be interpreted for determining the best response.
Moreover the results of the model are sensitive to the rules of interpretation as
demonstrated by comparing the present model to those of Ellingsen and Robles (2002),
Tröger (2002) and Dawid and MacLeod (2001, 2008). In their models it is simply
assumed that only actions that have been made given the same action set are considered.
However, since in reality two situations are never exactly the same, this does not seem
to be a very sensible assumption.
In contrast to this, the present model does specify an interpretation of actions made
given different action sets. While I believe that the assumption that demands are
interpreted as absolute shares of the surplus is reasonable, it definitely is not perfect.
How people in general use past experiences in similar but different situation remains an
open question for research though.
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A. Abstract
English
This paper explores an evolutionary model of the hold-up problem. Contrary to the
existing literature, I assume that players use information about past actions in similar
bargaining situations that differ with respect to the available surplus. Based on beliefs
that are derived from this information players choose their myopic best responses, which
lead to conflicting demands after changes of the investment levels.
In this setup I show that the evolutionary learning process will coordinate the players
actions on the efficient investment levels not only in the case of one-sided investment,
but also in the case of two-sided investment for a relevant range of parameters. It is also
shown that the distribution of the surplus yields a positive payoff for both players but
does not favour the investing party in the one-sided case.
Deutsch
Diese Diplomarbeit untersucht ein evolutionäres Modell des sogennanten Hold-up Prob-
lems. Im Gegensatz zur bestehenden Literatur nehme ich an, dass die Spieler Informa-
tionen über vergangenes Verhalten nutzen, das in ähnlichen Verhandlungsitutationen
mit unterschiedlich hohen Investitionsüberschüssen stattfand. Basierend auf diesen
Informationen wählen die Spieler ihre “myopic best responses”, was bei Änderungen der
Investitionsniveaus zu inkompatiblen Forderungen führt.
In diesem Modell zeige ich, dass der evolutionäre Lernprozess das Verhalten der Spieler
so koordiniert, dass diese das effiziente Investitionsniveau nicht nur im Falle einseitiger,
sondern für einen relevanten Parameterbereich auch im Falle beidseitiger Investitionen
wählen. Es wird auch gezeigt, dass die Verteilung des Investitionsüberschusses zu
positiven Gewinnen für beide Spieler führt, jedoch bei einseitigen Investitionen die
investierende Partei nicht begünstigt wird.
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